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INTRODUCTION 
Reverse payment settlements have ignited a firestorm debate 
among all affected parties: consumer groups, brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies, generic manufacturers, pharmaceutical 
wholesalers and retailers, lawmakers, executive agencies, and the 
federal courts.  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has waged 
a decade-long battle against such private settlements of 
pharmaceutical patent litigation as illegal market-sharing 
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agreements,1 with skirmishes among the circuits trending in favor 
of the settling parties2 until recently.3  The Third Circuit’s recent 
decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation unsettled this trend,4 
and the Supreme Court granted the FTC’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari in a separate case on the issue on December 7, 2012.5 
A reverse payment settlement is an agreement ending a 
pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a putative 
patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer, typically a 
generic firm, to settle a patent infringement case.6  In exchange, the 
alleged infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder’s patent 
or sell a generic version of the drug for a stated term.7  Because the 
payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been 
called a “reverse” payment. 
This Note argues that any standard of antitrust review for 
reverse payment settlements must involve an evaluation of the 
patent’s strength at the time the patent holder and generic firm 
enter into a settlement.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit is the court of competent jurisdiction to review a district 
court’s evaluation of a patent’s strength.  Part I reviews reverse 
payment settlements generally and the statutory schemes that 
promote their emergence.  Part II presents three approaches the 
circuit courts have adopted to review reverse payment settlements: 
per se illegality, a rebuttable presumption of illegality, and the 
scope of the patent test.  Part III argues that any standard of 
antitrust scrutiny must consider the patent’s strength at the time of 
the settlement—an approach no circuit has yet adopted—and that 
 
 1 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS: AN FTC STAFF STUDY, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FTC 
STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (“‘Pay-
for-delay’ agreements are ‘win-win’ for the companies: brand-name pharmaceutical 
prices stay high, and the brand and generic share the benefits of the brand’s monopoly 
profits.”). 
 2 See infra Part II.B. 
 3 See infra Part II.C. 
 4 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 5 F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 
sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416). 
 6 See infra Part I.A. 
 7 See infra Part I.A. 
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the Federal Circuit is the proper appellate court to review patent 
strength. 
I. BACKGROUND: REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND THE 
STATUTORY SETTING 
To understand the debate over the propriety of reverse payment 
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, one should be familiar 
with the statutory provisions that regulate FDA approval of new 
and generic bioequivalent drugs.  One should also understand the 
basic antitrust law principles enshrined by the Sherman Antitrust 
Act (the “Sherman Act”), and how they interact with basic patent 
law principles under the pharmaceutical industry’s unique 
regulatory approval scheme. 
A. Reverse Payment Settlements 
A reverse payment settlement is a resolution between disputing 
parties in a pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a 
putative patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer to 
settle a patent infringement case.8  In exchange, the alleged 
infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder’s patent or sell a 
generic version of the drug for a stated term.9  Because the 
payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been 
called a “reverse” payment.10  More “evocatively,”11 the FTC has 
referred to these settlements as “pay-for-delay” agreements.12 
The FTC has filed lawsuits and published studies censuring 
these settlements since 2001,13 arguing that they are unreasonable 
 
 8 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33717, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND INNOVATION, at 1 (2010), 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/574. 
 9 See THOMAS, supra note 8. 
 10 See THOMAS, supra note 8. 
 11 Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 12 See generally 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 1. 
 13 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, 
FTC RESOURCES FOR REPORTERS, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/competition/ 
payfordelay.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
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restraints of trade in violation of federal antitrust laws.14  Other 
commentators have argued that the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,15 commonly referred to as 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, created an incentive scheme that 
encourages such settlements.16  As of this writing, Congress has 
not articulated a test for determining whether reverse payment 
settlements implicate antitrust laws, although both chambers have 
introduced bills attempting to proscribe such agreements.17  
Congress’s failure to enact a policy has effectively left the question 
for the federal courts to decide,18 and six circuits have addressed 
whether reverse payment settlements are legal.19  On December 7, 
2012, the Supreme Court granted the FTC’s petition for a writ of 
 
 14 See, e.g., Brief of the FTC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging 
Reversal at 13, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2077, 
10-2078, 10-2079), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/05/110518amicusbrief.pdf 
(“Because such an agreement closely parallels market allocation arrangements 
universally recognized as unlawful, a presumption of antitrust illegality is justified.”); 
Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 26, King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 
F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Civil Action Nos. 2:06-cv-1797, 2:06-cv-1833, 2:06-cv-
2768, 2:08-cv-2141), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610182/080213 
complaint.pdf  (“Through its course of conduct, Cephalon has excluded competition and 
willfully maintained its monopoly . . . by compensating its potential competitors and 
abusing competitive and regulatory processes.”), abrogated by In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 
2012) (No. 12-245), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-
265). 
 15 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 
21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 16 See F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Federal 
law encourages generic drug manufacturers to file paragraph IV certifications.”), cert. 
granted sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-
416). See generally Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First 
Principles, 15 Fed. Cir. B.J. 617 (2006). 
 17 Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009).  Both bills died.  
The House reintroduced the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act in the 
112th Congress.  H.R. 3995, 112th Cong. (2012).  The Senate reintroduced the Preserve 
Access to Affordable Generics Act in the same Congress. S. 27, 112th Cong. (2012).  
Both bills died again. 
 18 THOMAS, supra note 8, at 2. 
 19 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 209. 
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certiorari to review the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit in F.T.C. 
v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.20 
B. The Statutory and Regulatory Landscape 
Before reviewing the three main approaches to evaluating 
reverse payment settlements, it is necessary to understand the 
statutory provisions that regulate FDA approval of new and 
generic bioequivalent drugs and to review the basic antitrust 
principles enshrined by the Sherman Act.  The pharmaceutical 
industry’s unique regulatory scheme has given rise to a unique 
tension between antitrust law and patent law in that industry. 
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Waxman” 
or the “Act”) in 1984 to achieve two seemingly disparate 
objectives—specifically, (1) to increase the availability of low cost 
generic drugs, and (2) to increase incentives for innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry.21  Three particular provisions in the Act 
advance the first objective, while three more advance the second.22  
But before reviewing each, a brief overview of the FDA approval 
process before 1984 is apposite. 
Before Hatch-Waxman, a generic firm could not legally 
develop a generic version of a brand-name drug until the 
innovator’s patent expired.23  Once the innovator’s patent did 
 
 20 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 81 
U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416). 
 21 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 
2647–48; see also Presidential Statement on Signing the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 225 (Sept. 24, 1984) 
(announcing that “[t]he legislation will . . . make the generic versions [of brand-name 
drugs] more widely available to consumers[] and grant pharmaceutical firms added 
incentives to develop new drugs”). 
 22 See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 41–45 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, 
Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements]. 
 23 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 
402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
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expire, federal food and drug law required the generic firm to 
obtain FDA approval to market the drug by filing an extensive 
“New Drug Application” (“NDA”).24  The FDA’s safety and 
efficacy requirements often required generic firms to coordinate 
“needlessly costly, duplicative and time-consuming” clinical trials 
that largely eviscerated the benefit of manufacturing and marketing 
cheap generic drugs.25  As a result, “[s]ome observers noted that 
although patents on important drugs had expired, manufacturers 
were not moving to introduce generic equivalents for these 
products.”26  In fact, in 1984, generic drugs made up only 18.6 
percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States.27  
Hatch-Waxman significantly eroded these statutory and regulatory 
obstacles to generic drug market entry. 
a) Promoting generic competition 
i. The “safe harbor” provision 
Title II of the Act amended the Patent Act of 1952 and created 
a “safe harbor” provision for the use of a patented invention 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information” to the FDA.28  This provision carefully 
expanded lawful uses of a patented invention to include testing that 
would allow a generic manufacturer to establish generic 
bioequivalency.29  The exemption legislatively overruled Roche 
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., which had held that a 
 
 24 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756, PATENT 
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT”), at 20 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/ 
crsreports/crsdocuments/rl3075601102005.pdf. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at 27 (1998) 
[hereinafter CBO STUDY]. 
 28 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
 29 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 
2692 (“[T]he only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of 
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic 
substitute.  The patent holder retains the right to exclude others from the major 
commercial marketplace during the life of the patent.  Thus, the nature of the interference 
with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”). 
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generic firm’s experimental use of a patented invention for 
business reasons was “a violation of the rights of the patentee to 
exclude others from using his patented invention.”30  Roche had 
effectively required generic manufacturers to delay generic 
bioequivalency tests until the patentee’s patent expired,31 which 
would result in a de facto patent extension32 of about two years 
after the expiration of the patent.33  In overruling Roche, Congress 
noted that the safe harbor provision “was essential to implement 
the policy objective of getting safe and effective generic substitutes 
on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the 
patent.”34 
Two Supreme Court decisions have since interpreted the safe 
harbor provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), as broadly as 
possible.35  In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held 
that the safe harbor provision exempts not only drugs, but the 
range of patented inventions covered by the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), including medical devices, food 
additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs, and human 
biological products.36  Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 
further expanded the scope of the safe harbor, holding that 
preclinical studies of patented compounds that were not ultimately 
submitted to the FDA were protected so long as they were 
“reasonably related to the development and submission of any 
information under the FDCA.”37  The Court noted that unprotected 
 
 30 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
superseded by statute, Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 
1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
 31 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 
(“Without [the Section] generic manufacturers would be required to engage in these 
bioequivalency tests after the expiration of the patent.”). 
 32 Daniel Wobbekind, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA: Re-Examining the 
Broad Scope of the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 107, 107 (2008). 
 33 See H.R. REP NO. 98-857(II), at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 (“This 
would result in delays of about two years after the expiration of the patent before a 
generic could go on the market.”). 
 34 Id. at 9. 
 35 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 36 496 U.S. at 673–74; see also 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2006). 
 37 545 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added). 
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uses would include “[b]asic scientific research on a particular 
compound, performed without the intent to develop a particular 
drug or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause the sort of 
physiological effect the researcher intends to induce.”38  Thus the 
safe harbor provision extinguished the patent holder’s de facto 
extension of patent rights beyond the patent term39 and, as 
interpreted by the Court, carved out room for trial and error in 
generic drug development.40 
ii. The Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Title I of the Act, which amended the FDCA, introduced a new 
type of application for generic firms seeking FDA approval of a 
drug, termed the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).41  
Under an ANDA, generic manufacturers who establish that a 
proposed drug has the same active ingredient(s), route of 
administration, dosage form, and strength, among other things, as 
an innovator’s previously approved NDA, can rely, or 
“piggyback,”42 on the FDA’s finding of safety and efficacy for that 
drug.43  While an ANDA need not contain “duplicative testing 
requirements” showing a proposed drug’s safety and efficacy,44 it 
must contain information proving bioequivalence to a previously 
approved drug.45 
 
 38 Id. at 205–06. 
 39 B. Scott Eidson, How Safe Is the Harbor? Considering the Economic Implications of 
Patent Infringement in Section 271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1169, 1172 (2004); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 
2678–79 (“It is the Committee’s view that experimental activity does not have any 
adverse economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the life of a patent, but 
prevention of such activity would extend the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity 
beyond the patent expiration date.”). 
 40 Merck, 545 U.S. at 206. 
 41 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).  A similar abbreviated process existed for prescription 
drugs approved before 1962. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48; see also CBO STUDY, supra note 27, at 3. 
 42 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 43 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 44 CBO STUDY, supra note 27, at 43. 
 45 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).  A drug is considered “bioequivalent” to a previously 
approved drug if: 
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a 
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the 
listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the 
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The applicant must also certify that (1) the NDA holder has not 
filed patent information with the FDA (Paragraph I); (2) the NDA 
holder’s patent has expired (Paragraph II); (3) the NDA holder’s 
patent will expire on a certain date (Paragraph III); or (4) the NDA 
holder’s patent is invalid or the ANDA applicant’s proposed drug 
will not infringe it (Paragraph IV).46  The FDA may immediately 
approve an ANDA certified under Paragraphs I or II.47  The FDA 
cannot approve an ANDA certified under Paragraph III until the 
patent expires.48 
A Paragraph IV certification is an act of patent infringement 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.49  An ANDA applicant making a 
Paragraph IV certification must notify the patent and NDA 
holder(s) within twenty days.50  The notice must include a detailed 
statement of the factual and legal basis of the applicant’s opinion 
that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed.51  If the patent 
holder does not file a patent infringement suit within forty-five 
days, the FDA may approve the ANDA immediately.52  If the 
 
therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in either 
a single dose or multiple doses; or 
(ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a significant 
difference from the extent of absorption of the listed drug when 
administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient 
under similar experimental conditions in either a single dose or 
multiple doses and the difference from the listed drug in the rate of 
absorption of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its proposed 
labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective body drug 
concentrations on chronic use, and is considered medically 
insignificant for the drug. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B). 
 46 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 47 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i); see also F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 
1303 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416). 
 48 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii); see also Watson, 677 F.3d at 1303. 
 49 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006). See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 
661, 678 (1990) (“That is what is achieved by § 271(e)(2)—the creation of a highly 
artificial act of infringement that consists of submitting an ANDA or a paper NDA 
containing the fourth type of certification . . . .”). 
 50 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
 51 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv). 
 52 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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patent holder files a timely claim, it receives an automatic thirty-
month stay of FDA approval.53 
If before final judgment or the expiration of the thirty-month 
stay the FDA approves the proposed generic drug, the approval is 
tentative.54  Such an approval becomes effective the earlier of 
when (1) the thirty-month stay expires; (2) the court rules the 
patent is invalid or has not been infringed; or (3) the court enters a 
settlement order or consent decree stating that the patent is invalid 
or has not been infringed.55  If the court decides the patent is valid 
and has been infringed, the FDA delays approval of the ANDA 
until the patent expires.56 
If the court has not resolved the patent litigation before the end 
of the thirty-month period, the ANDA filer may begin marketing 
the drug, but assumes the risk that it may be found liable if the 
court eventually rules the patent is valid and infringed.57  
Alternatively, the NDA holder and ANDA applicant may settle the 
suit before final judgment.58  The Hatch-Waxman Act does not 
prohibit settlements.59 
iii. The 180-day exclusivity period 
The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic manufacturers to 
file Paragraph IV certifications (“ANDA-IVs”) and risk the cost of 
ensuing litigation by rewarding the first firm to file an ANDA-IV 
 
 53 Id.  Some commentators have likened the stay to an automatic preliminary 
injunction. E.g., 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW § 15.3 (2010), available at 2010 WL 3999073. 
 54 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 21 C.F.R. 314.105(d). 
 55 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 56 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II). 
 57 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“It seems relatively clear, however, that if there is no resolution of the 
patent litigation and a stay is not granted, and the patent holder has not obtained 
preliminary injunctive relief, the ANDA filer may begin to market its product.  In such an 
instance, the ANDA filer assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the 
pioneer manufacturer’s patent.”). 
 58 See THOMAS, supra note 8, at 8. 
 59 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
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with 180 days of generic marketing exclusivity.60  During this 
period, the FDA cannot approve another ANDA-IV for the drug.61  
The exclusivity period begins to run when the first applicant who 
submits a “substantially complete” ANDA-IV begins 
commercially marketing its drug.62 
Until 1998, the FDA took the position that the 180-day 
exclusivity period was available only to first filers who 
successfully defended patent infringement suits.63  Under this 
interpretation, first filers who were not sued for patent 
infringement were ineligible for the exclusivity period.64  The D.C. 
Circuit overturned the FDA’s “successful-defense” requirement as 
inconsistent with the plain language of Hatch-Waxman in Mova 
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala.65  According to Mova, the statute 
clearly provided that the 180-day exclusivity period began on the 
earlier of the date of the first filer’s first commercial marketing of 
the drug, or, as the statute provided at the time, the date of a court 
decision finding the patent to be invalid or not infringed.66  The 
 
 60 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); William J. Newsom, Exceeding the Scope of the 
Patent: Solving the Reverse Payment Settlement Problem Through Antitrust Enforcement 
and Regulatory Reform, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 201, 206 (2009). 
 61 Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM 
EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT, at i (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FTC STUDY], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf  (“[W]hen the [first filer] 
challenges the brand’s patent, the FDA may not approve any additional generic 
competitors until 180 days after the first-filer launches its product.”). 
 62 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).  But, “[i]f multiple applicants file substantially 
complete ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications on the same day as the first to do so, 
those applicants can share exclusivity.”  Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the 
Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 55 (2007). 
 63 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1994). 
 64 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id.  The statute stated in relevant part: 
If the [ANDA] contains a [paragraph IV certification] and is for a 
drug for which a previous application has been submitted under this 
subsection continuing [sic] such a certification, the application shall 
be made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty days 
after— 
(I) the date the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the 
previous [ANDA] of the first commercial marketing of the drug 
under the previous [ANDA], or 
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court reasoned that “Congress may have intended to reward the 
first ANDA applicant for his enterprise whether or not he is later 
sued.”67  Indeed, when Congress amended Hatch-Waxman as part 
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, it provided that the 180-day 
exclusivity period begins solely on the date of the first commercial 
marketing of the drug by any first applicant.68 
Marketing exclusivity is “a bounty worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars for a major drug.”69  In fact, “generics often make more 
than half of their total profits on a drug during the period of 
generic exclusivity.”70  And the opportunity for 180 days of 
marketing exclusivity, in addition to the availability of the ANDA 
process and safe harbor protection, has helped fundamentally 
transform the pharmaceutical industry.  In 1996, twelve years after 
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, the share of generic 
units sold domestically more than doubled from 18.6 percent to 
 
(II) the date of a decision of a court in [a patent infringement action] 
holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be 
invalid or not infringed, 
whichever is earlier. 
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:  180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-
WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 2 (1998) 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994) (amended 2003)), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf. 
 67 Mova, 140 F.3d at 1071 n.11. 
 68 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (2012).  
The statute now reads: 
[If an ANDA-IV] is for a drug for which a first applicant has 
submitted an application containing such a certification, the 
application shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days after 
the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug . . . by any first 
applicant. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2006). 
 69 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 70 C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug 
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948 n.3 (2011). 
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42.6 percent.71  Today, generics represent approximately 80 
percent of all drug units sold.72 
b) Promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
i. Patent term extension 
Before 1962, innovators needed only to demonstrate a drug’s 
safety to obtain FDA approval.73  Unless the FDA rejected the 
NDA, the innovator could begin marketing the drug sixty days 
after submitting its application.74  Congress amended the FDCA in 
1962 to require an NDA to prove the proposed drug’s safety and 
efficacy.75 
Proving efficacy requires additional years of clinical trials.76  A 
“showing of efficacy requires that the drug be investigated in 
controlled clinical trials by multiple groups, and that these trials, 
when subjected to a statistical analysis, prove the drug to be 
efficacious.”77  Because innovators conduct most clinical testing 
after a patent issues,78 the new efficacy requirement shortened the 
innovator’s “effective patent life”—the time between FDA 
approval and patent expiration.79  In response, pharmaceutical 
research and development declined significantly to make up for 
 
 71 CBO STUDY, supra note 27, at 43. 
 72 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), 2012 Industry 
Profile, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/ 
phrma_industry_profile.pdf. 
 73 Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 43. 
 74 Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises 
Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 313 (2005) 
(citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(explaining § 505 of the FDCA, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1052 (1938)), superseded by statute, 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 
402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990)). 
 75 Id. (citing Roche, 733 F.2d at 864 (explaining the Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. 
L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780)). 
 76 See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 43. 
 77 Lee S. Wilkinson, Legal Resolution of Denial of Access to Medical Technology, 14 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 203, 244 (1984). 
 78 Roche, 733 F.2d at 864. 
 79 Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 44. 
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increased costs and reduced returns.80  Many scholars have referred 
to this post-1962 decline in new chemical entities and other new 
drugs as the “innovation crisis.”81 
To restore innovation after the 1962 amendments, the Hatch-
Waxman Act introduced a procedure to extend patent terms.82  
Innovators may now request patent term extensions from the 
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) within sixty days of FDA approval.83  The PTO follows 
four steps to calculate the total period eligible for extension84: (1) 
identify the innovator’s “regulatory review period,” composed of 
the innovator’s testing and approval phases after the patent 
issues;85 (2) reduce each phase by the amount of time that the FDA 
finds the applicant did not exercise due diligence in obtaining 
 
 80 Id. at 43–44 (citing John R. Virts & J. Fred Weston, Returns to Research and 
Development in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 1 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
103, 110 (1980)).  Carrier notes that “[b]efore the 1962 amendments, the effective patent 
life nearly matched the 17-year patent term.  By 1981, it had fallen to less than seven 
years.” Id. at 44 (citing James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 
CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 451–52 (1986)). 
 81 Id. at 43. 
 82 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); see also PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that § 156 “was designed to restore a portion of the patent 
life lost during the period of regulatory review, in order to preserve the economic 
incentive for development of new therapeutic products” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), 
at 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2670)).  Section 156 interprets 
“products” as any drug product, medical device, food additive, or color additive subject 
to regulation under the FDCA. 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(1).  In addition to extending patent 
terms for products, § 156 also extends patent terms for methods of using a product and 
methods of manufacturing a product. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a). 
 83 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1). 
 84 See FDA: SMALL BUSINESS ASSISTANCE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE 
PATENT TERM RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval 
process/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069959.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter 
FDA FAQS ON PATENT TERM RESTORATION].   
 85 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(1)(B); 35 U.S.C. § 156(c); see also FDA FAQS ON PATENT 
TERM RESTORATION, supra note 84.  The testing phase is “the period between the 
effective date of an investigational product exemption (Investigational New Drug 
Application) and the initial submission of the marketing application (New Drug 
Application).  The approval phase is the period between the submission and approval of 
the marketing application.”  FDA FAQS ON PATENT TERM RESTORATION, supra note 84. 
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regulatory approval;86 (3) take one-half of the adjusted testing 
phase and add it to the adjusted approval phase to arrive at the total 
eligible period for extension;87 and (4) cap the extension at five 
years88 and the remaining term of the restored patent following 
FDA marketing approval at fourteen years.89 
Some commentators have openly doubted whether Hatch-
Waxman’s patent term restoration provision delivers a real benefit 
to pharmaceutical innovators.  In a prepared statement for a 
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, then President of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), explained that “the net 
effect of Hatch-Waxman has been a deterioration in intellectual 
property protection for pharmaceuticals.”  Mossinghoff cited as 
primarily responsible “the many restrictions placed on the patent 
term restoration period,” the availability of the streamlined ANDA 
for FDA approval of generic drugs, and the statutory safe harbor 
from patent infringement.90 
 
 86 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1).  Due diligence means “that degree of attention, continuous 
directed effort, and timeliness as may reasonably be expected from, and are ordinarily 
exercised by, a person during a regulatory review period.”  35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(3).  The 
FDA assists the PTO by filing due diligence petitions and appearing at due diligence 
hearings. See FDA FAQS ON THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION, supra note 84. 
 87 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2). 
 88 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A). 
 89 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3); WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS21129, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION, at 
2 (2002), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/ 
crsdocuments/RS21129.pdf. 
 90 A Decade Later: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 121–22 (1996) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America).  Mossinghoff cited the results of a Boston Consulting Group 
study to support his proposition: 
Before Hatch-Waxman, the typical innovator drug enjoyed a total of 
14–17 years of market exclusivity—nine years of effective patent life 
plus a five- to eight-year period between patent expiration and the 
marketing of a generic copy.  As a result of Hatch-Waxman, the total 
period of intellectual property protection has shrunk to 11.7 years—
since generic drugs can now enter the market immediately after 
patent expiration.  Thus, the net practical effect of Hatch-Waxman 
was to reduce the period of intellectual property protection for 
innovator drugs by periods that range from 2.3 to 5.3 years. 
Id. at 121. 
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Other commentators say the patent term extension “has been 
successful in increasing the patent term.”91  But drug patent terms 
alone do not provide a full picture.  Before Hatch-Waxman, brand 
companies enjoyed effective market exclusivity after their patent 
terms expired for a five- to eight-year period between patent 
expiration and the marketing of a generic copy.92  Thus, 
Mossinghoff, and commentators like him, argue that the safe 
harbor provision and ANDA process shortened the innovator’s “de 
facto” monopoly in lieu of a shorter, de jure patent term extension.  
Evidently, the benefits of Hatch-Waxman’s patent term restoration 
are disputed. 
ii. Non-patent marketing exclusivity for new chemical 
entities 
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the FDCA to provide non-
patent marketing exclusivity periods to listed drugs that introduce 
new active ingredients,93 or “new chemical entities.”94  The FDA 
defines a new chemical entity (“NCE”) as “a drug that contains no 
active moiety that has been approved by FDA” in a previous NDA 
application.95  An “active moiety,” in turn, is “the molecule or ion, 
excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause the 
drug to be an ester, salt . . . or other noncovalent derivative . . . of 
the molecule, responsible for the physiological or pharmacological 
action of the drug substance.”96 
Under this provision, the FDA may not approve an ANDA-IV 
for the first four years after NDA approval, and it may not approve 
an ANDA with Paragraph I, II, or III certifications for the first five 
years.97  The provision benefits innovators who discover new 
active ingredients by “restrict[ing] a potential generic manufacturer 
 
 91 Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 50. 
 92 See Hearings, supra note 90, at 121 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America).  
 93 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006). 
 94 21 § C.F.R. 314.108(a). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. (emphasis added). 
 97 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b). 
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from bringing a product to market for five years plus the length of 
the FDA review of the generic application.”98 
iii. The thirty-month stay of FDA approval 
An ANDA-IV applicant must provide a notice statement within 
twenty days to each patent holder that is the subject of the 
Paragraph IV certification and NDA holder on whose NDA the 
applicant relies.99  The notice must “include a detailed statement of 
the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the 
patent is invalid or will not be infringed.”100  To trigger a stay of 
FDA approval of the generic firm’s ANDA, the patent holder must 
initiate a patent infringement suit within forty-five days of 
receiving the ANDA filer’s notice.101  During this period, the 
generic cannot enter the market.102 
FDA approval of the ANDA becomes effective after thirty 
months unless the patent expires before then or a district court 
earlier decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed, in which 
case approval is effective on the date a court enters judgment in 
favor of the generic.103  The thirty-month stay approximates the 
length of a patent case to reach final judgment,104 and has been 
compared to an automatic preliminary injunction because it 
provides the patent holder “an absolute, although time-limited, 
 
 98 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32917, BIOTERRORISM COUNTERMEASURE 
DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES IN PATENTS AND HOMELAND SECURITY, at 11–12 (2006), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32917.pdf  (“The purpose of NCE exclusivity is to 
encourage the development of innovative drug products that include an entirely new 
active ingredient (commonly termed the ‘active moiety’), in contrast to ‘me-too’ drugs 
that consist of chemical variants of previously known compounds.”). 
 99 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 100 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv). 
 101 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 102 See id. 
 103 Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY at ii (2002) [hereinafter 2002 FTC STUDY], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf  (“Filing of the lawsuit stays FDA’s 
approval of the ANDA until the earliest of:  (1) the date the patents expire; (2) a 
determination of non-infringement or patent invalidity by a court in the patent litigation; 
or (3) the expiration of 30 months from the receipt of notice of the Paragraph IV 
certification.”). 
 104 See id. at 47.  Patent cases take several months longer on average to reach final 
judgment on appeal.  Id. 
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right to exclude a competitor from the market” without any 
showing that the patent holder will likely prevail on the merits.105 
2. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act (the “Medicare Act”), 
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act.106  The Medicare Act remedied 
several of Hatch-Waxman’s “statutory design bugs,”107 which had 
permitted litigants’ abuse of the thirty-month stay and 180-day 
marketing exclusivity period.108 
a) Eliminating abuse of the thirty-month stay of FDA 
approval 
Before the passage of the Medicare Act, several NDA holders 
used an apparent loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act to obtain 
successive thirty-month stays of FDA approval.109  After a generic 
firm filed an ANDA-IV, the NDA holder could list with the FDA 
additional patents in connection with the NDA.110  The late-listed 
patents required the ANDA applicant to file additional 
certifications.111  Because each certification triggered a statutory 
 
 105 Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 514–15 (2007).  
Traditionally, a patentee seeking a preliminary injunction must show:  “(1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”  eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 106 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42 
U.S.C.), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 107 See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of 
Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390–91 (2011). 
 108 See Greene, supra note 74, at 349. 
 109 Id. at 331.  Prior to the 2003 amendments, Hatch-Waxman had not expressly 
proscribed such stacking.  Id. at 317. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
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act of infringement, the brand firm could stack multiple thirty-
month stays.112 
Infamously, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) exploited this loophole 
after a generic manufacturer, Apotex, challenged GSK’s listed 
patent for the active ingredient in Paxil in 1998.113  After Apotex’s 
initial Paragraph IV certification, GSK listed nine additional 
patents for the drug with the FDA.114  Apotex filed additional 
Paragraph IV certifications for each.115  GSK brought four 
additional patent infringement suits against Apotex, resulting in an 
effective five-year stay on FDA approval for a generic version of 
the antidepressant.116  The Medicare Act closed this loophole by 
allowing only one thirty-month stay for patents listed with the 
FDA at the time the generic firm files an ANDA-IV.117 
b) Eliminating abuse of the 180-day exclusivity period 
Before the Medicare Act, various Hatch-Waxman litigants 
entered reverse payment settlements “parking” the 180-day 
marketing exclusivity period.118  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
originally provided that the 180-day exclusivity period would be 
triggered on the earlier of the date of first commercial marketing of 
the generic drug (the “first commercial marketing” trigger) or the 
date of a court decision holding the brand firm’s drug patent 
 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. at 332 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103, at 51). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103, at 51–52. 
 117 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).  The statute states in relevant part: 
If the applicant made a certification described in subclause (IV) . . . 
the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the 
expiration of 45 days after . . . the notice . . . is received, an action is 
brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the 
certification and for which information was submitted to the 
Secretary . . . before the date on which the application . . .  was 
submitted. If such an action is brought before the expiration of such 
days, the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the 
thirty-month period . . . . 
Id. 
 118 Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 
Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 159 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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invalid or not infringed (the “court decision” trigger).119  The FDA 
could not approve a subsequent ANDA until the end of the 180-
day period.120  To delay triggering the 180-day exclusivity period, 
NDA holders compensated ANDA filers through settlements.121  
This practice created a bottleneck preventing FDA approval of 
subsequently filed ANDAs.122 
The Medicare Act established “forfeiture events” restricting a 
first applicant’s entitlement to exclusivity, including if the first 
applicant (1) fails to market within seventy-five days of final FDA 
approval or thirty months after submitting its ANDA, whichever is 
earlier; (2) fails to market within seventy-five days of a court 
decision finding the patent invalid or not infringed, a court signing 
a settlement order or consent decree finding the patent invalid or 
not infringed, or the NDA holder withdrawing its patent 
information from its NDA; (3) withdraws its application or the 
FDA considers it withdrawn because it does not meet its 
requirements for approval; (4) amends or withdraws the 
certifications that qualified it for exclusivity; (5) fails to obtain 
tentative FDA approval within the first thirty months of filing, 
unless the failure is caused by a change in or a review of the 
requirements for approval after filing; (6) enters into an agreement 
with another ANDA applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, 
and the FTC or DOJ files a complaint that results in the FTC or a 
court’s final, unappealable decision (except for a petition to the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) that the agreement violates 
antitrust laws; or (7) no longer qualifies for the 180-day exclusivity 
period because all of the patents for which it submitted a 
certification have expired.123  The Medicare Act thus curbed 
perceived abuses to the 180-day exclusivity period that some 
litigants effected through reverse payment settlements.124 
 
 119 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984) (amended 2003).  For the statutory text before 
revision by the Medicare Act, see supra note 66. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 190. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.; see also Lietzan & Korn, supra note 62, at 50–51. 
 124 Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 190. 
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c) Requiring notice to antitrust enforcement agencies 
Additionally, the Medicare Act requires any agreement 
between a brand-name drug company and generic firm regarding 
the manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the drug listed in the 
generic’s ANDA to be filed with the FTC and United States 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for antitrust review.125  In effect, 
this requires parties to give notice of reverse payment settlements 
to antitrust enforcement agencies.126 
3. The Patent Act 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to grant 
inventors exclusive monopoly rights to their inventions: “Congress 
shall have the power . . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”127  Less than two years after the States ratified the 
Constitution in 1788,128 the First Congress during its Second 
Session enacted the Patent Act of 1790, setting the conditions for 
obtaining a patent.129  Subsequent statutory enactments, 
collectively known as the Patent Acts, modified and added to these 
conditions.130  The Patent Act of 1952 (the “Patent Act”), as 
amended, currently governs patent law.131 
The Patent Act provides that “[a] patent shall be presumed to 
be valid” and that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a 
patent . . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”132  In 
 
 125 Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1112, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 126 See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 47. 
 127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 128 Paul Rodgers, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 108 
(2011). 
 129 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112. 
 130 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323; Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 
117; Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353–355; Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 
198–217; Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, 53 Stat. 1212–1213; Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 
66 Stat. 792–817. 
 131 See 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq (2006). 
 132 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006).  But “[t]he burden always is on the patentee to show 
infringement.”  Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1987) (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); 
see also Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative 
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patent infringement litigation, the invalidity defense must “be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence.”133  Accordingly, in 
Hatch-Waxman litigation, a patent holder enjoys a presumption of 
validity, and the ANDA filer must show invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence.134 
4. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very 
contract . . . in restraint of trade . . . among the several States . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”135  The Supreme Court has held that 
“Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the 
word ‘every,’” and has instead held that the Sherman Act outlaws 
only unreasonable restraints of trade.136  Most restraints are 
evaluated under a “rule of reason” standard, under which the fact 
finder must make an “elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness” of 
a firm’s behavior in the context of a particular industry.137 
Rule of reason analysis can entail enormous litigation expenses 
and strain judicial resources.138  Thus the Court has developed an 
alternative doctrine for agreements that are manifestly 
anticompetitive: “[T]here are certain agreements or practices 
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of 
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to 
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their 
use.”139  Such agreements are per se illegal under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.140  Several practices have traditionally fallen within 
 
Approach, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 83, 86 n.11 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, The Legislative 
Approach] (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
 133 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
 134 Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) aff’d, Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 135 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 136 Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citing United 
States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 140 Id. 
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this category, including “price fixing[,] division of markets[,] 
group boycotts[,] and tying arrangements.”141 
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
On March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments 
in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc.142  The case seeks to resolve under what 
circumstances reverse payment settlements are unreasonable 
restraints of trade that violate federal antitrust law.  Many courts 
and commentators have observed that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
creates a climate that encourages reverse payment settlements.143  
The Second Circuit subscribed to this view in In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litigation, explaining that under the Hatch-
Waxman regulatory scheme, generic firms file ANDA-IVs 
“before . . . spen[ding] substantial sums on the manufacturing, 
marketing, or distribution of the potentially infringing generic 
drug.”144  Consequently, the first ANDA filer in a patent 
infringement action stands to lose little “beyond litigation costs 
and the opportunity for future profits from selling the generic 
drug,”145 but stands to gain a lucrative 180-day marketing 
exclusivity period during which it participates in an effective 
 
 141 Id. (citations omitted).  A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one 
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) 
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.”  
Id. at 5–6. 
 142 Transcript of Oral Argument, F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-416.pdf. 
 143 See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that “because of the generic 
manufacturer’s entitlement under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to institute patent 
litigation merely by filing an ANDA IV, the statutory scheme has the unintended 
consequence of altering the litigation risks of patent lawsuits”). See generally Anjan 
Chatterji & Xiang Yu, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies Choose to Pay Generics 
in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of Asymmetric Risks in Litigation, 
10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 19 (2011) (arguing that, in light of the asymmetric 
litigation risks in Hatch-Waxman litigation, reverse payment settlements need not be 
collusive to be rational). 
 144 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206 (emphasis in original). 
 145 Id. at 206–07. 
C05_KHATIBIFAR (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2013  5:45 PM 
2013] EVALUATING REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 1375 
duopoly with the original NDA filer.146  Even though the first 
filer’s litigation expenses may amount to several millions of 
dollars,147 its revenues from the exclusivity period could reach 
hundreds of millions of dollars for “blockbuster” drugs.148  Thus, a 
generic firm evaluating the potential risks and benefits of filing an 
ANDA-IV may rationally decide to roll the dice and trigger a 
statutory act of patent infringement.149 
The branded patent holder, on the other hand, is in no better 
position than before if it prevails in the patent infringement action.  
Money damages are not available since the generic firm usually 
has not yet entered the market.  The patent holder’s benefit is 
virtually limited to continued patent protection against that ANDA 
challenger.150  On the other hand, if the brand loses the suit, it 
relinquishes its patent monopoly.151  Some commentators have 
pointed to these “exceedingly” asymmetric litigation risks to 
explain the unconventional reverse flow of consideration from the 
plaintiff-patent holder to the defendant-generic challenger.152 
Other courts and commentators have been more skeptical.153  
Many believe reverse payments resemble collusion and reject any 
notion that economically rational behavior exonerates antitrust 
liability.154  The FTC has stated that “the competition laws exist 
 
 146 Id. at 207. 
 147 Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 19. 
 148 Id. at 4.  A “blockbuster” drug is a drug that generates more than $1 billion of 
revenue per year. See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31511, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY AND ITS EFFECTS ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, at 3 
n.8 (2009), available at http://policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18823.pdf.  
Examples include “Cipro, Claritin, Paxil, Pravachol, Prilosec, Prozac, and Zoloft.”  
Carrier, The Legislative Approach, supra note 132, at 87 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra 
note 103, at 14). 
 149 Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 21. 
 150 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 6. 
 153 See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for 
cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 12-245), petition for cert. filed, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265); Carrier, The Legislative Approach, supra 
note 132, at 88. 
 154 See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property 
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1758 (2003) (“We do not think it follows that because 
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precisely to counteract commercial environments that encourage 
collusive and anticompetitive behavior.”155  The Third Circuit 
recently endorsed this view, criticizing reverse payment 
settlements because they “permit the sharing of monopoly rents 
between would-be competitors without any assurance that the 
underlying patent is valid.”156 
Since 2001, several circuit courts have developed legal 
standards under which to analyze reverse payment settlements.  
Roughly three approaches to evaluating reverse payment 
settlements have emerged157: (1) per se illegal treatment (Sixth 
Circuit);158 (2) the “scope of the patent” test (Eleventh, Second, 
and Federal Circuits);159 and (3) the “quick look” rule of reason 
test, which applies a rebuttable presumption of illegality (Third 
Circuit).160 
A. Per Se Illegal Treatment 
In 2003, before the enactment of the Medicare Act, the Sixth 
Circuit declared reverse payment settlements per se illegal in In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.161  This case centered on 
Cardizem CD, a brand-name prescription drug used to treat angina 
and hypertension and prevent heart attack and stroke.162  In 1995, 
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”), a generic manufacturer, 
filed an ANDA-IV seeking FDA approval to manufacture, market, 
and sell a generic version of Cardizem CD, which at the time was 
manufactured and marketed by Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 
(“HMR”).163  Andrx was the first generic firm to file an ANDA-
IV, entitling it to the coveted 180 days of marketing exclusivity.164 
 
it is rational for the patentee to agree to an exclusion payment, that payment cannot be 
anticompetitive.”). 
 155 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 
(11th Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216. 
 157 See Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 23. 
 158 See infra Part II.A. 
 159 See infra Part II.B. 
 160 See infra Part II.C. 
 161 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004). 
 162 Id. at 901. 
 163 Id. at 901–02. 
 164 Id. at 902. 
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In 1996, HMR brought a patent infringement claim against 
Andrx.165  As the suit pended in federal court, the FDA issued 
tentative approval of Andrx’s ANDA.166  Nine days later, the 
parties entered into an agreement, wherein Andrx promised it 
would not market a generic version of Cardizem CD upon 
receiving final FDA approval or transfer or relinquish its 180-day 
exclusivity period to another company.167  In exchange, HMR 
agreed to compensate Andrx with $40 million per year, payable 
quarterly after the FDA issued final approval, and further agreed to 
compensate Andrx $100 million per year to abstain from the 
market after a final, unappealable judgment that Andrx did not 
infringe HMR’s patent.168  When the thirty-month stay period 
ended in 1998 and the FDA issued final approval of Andrx’s 
ANDA, HMR began making $10 million quarterly payments, 
Andrx did not enter the market, and the 180-day marketing 
exclusivity period was not triggered.169  The parties eventually 
settled the patent infringement suit in 1999 for a final additional 
sum of $50.7 million.170 
State law plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, and class 
representatives filed complaints against HMR and Andrx alleging 
antitrust injuries.171  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged “that but for 
the Agreement, specifically the payment of $40 million per year, 
Andrx would have brought its generic product to market once it 
received FDA approval and at a lower price than the patented 
Cardizem CD sold by HMR.”172  In addition, the plaintiffs alleged 
that Andrx’s delayed market entry “parked” the start of its 180-day 
marketing exclusivity period and blocked “other potential generic 
competitors.”173 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 902–03. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 903 n.7.  A judicial panel on multidistrict litigation consolidated the claims.  
Id. 
 172 Id. at 904. 
 173 See id. 
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The Sixth Circuit held that the HMR-Andrx Agreement “was, 
at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the 
market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a 
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”174  In addition 
to the quarterly payments to refrain from marketing its generic 
version of Cardizem CD, the court found dispositive the fact that 
“by delaying Andrx’s entry into the market, the Agreement also 
delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter 
until the expiration of Andrx’s 180-day period of marketing 
exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or 
transfer.”175  At least to the extent that reverse payment settlements 
involved “parking” the 180-day exclusivity period, the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach was a clear categorical condemnation of such 
agreements. 
Cases in other circuits, such as In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litigation in the Second Circuit, have openly questioned 
the continued vitality of Cardizem after the Medicare Act because 
it involved parking the 180-day exclusivity period and blocking 
subsequent ANDA filers.176  The Medicare Act of 2003 
subsequently established forfeiture events intended to prevent 
parking the 180-day exclusivity period, a practice the following 
cases did not so nakedly involve.177 
B. The Scope of the Patent Test 
1. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit articulated the most deferential standard for 
evaluating reverse payment settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litigation.178  This case involved the patent for 
tamoxifen, a prescription drug for the treatment of breast cancer.179  
In 1987, Imperial Chemical Industries (“ICI”) brought suit against 
Barr, a generic manufacturer and the first ANDA-IV filer for 
 
 174 Id. at 908. 
 175 Id. at 908–09 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cmty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 
(1982)). 
 176 See, e.g., 466 F.3d 187 (2d. Cir. 2005). 
 177 See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 178 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 179 Id. at 193. 
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tamoxifen.180  The district court declared ICI’s tamoxifen patent 
invalid after finding ICI had intentionally withheld critical testing 
information from the PTO.181  While ICI’s appeal was pending in 
the Federal Circuit, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement.182  Zeneca, ICI’s successor-in-interest to the tamoxifen 
patent, agreed to compensate Barr with $21 million and a non-
exclusive license to sell tamoxifen under Barr’s label if Barr would 
change its ANDA to a Paragraph III certification, thereby agreeing 
not to sell its generic version of tamoxifen until Zeneca’s patent 
expired.183  The parties also agreed that if a subsequent ANDA-IV 
challenger prevailed against Zeneca in a patent infringement suit, 
Barr could “revert to a paragraph IV ANDA certification.”184  
Finally, the parties moved to vacate the district court’s opinion that 
Zeneca’s patent was invalid.185  The district court granted the 
motion.186 
Consumer groups filed lawsuits alleging the Zeneca-Barr 
settlement violated antitrust laws.187  The plaintiffs also alleged 
that Zeneca and Barr “‘understood’ that if another generic 
manufacturer attempted to market a version of tamoxifen, Barr 
would seek to prevent the manufacturer from doing so by 
attempting to invoke the 180-day exclusivity right possessed by the 
first ‘paragraph IV’ filer.”188  The district court upheld the 
agreement, and the Second Circuit affirmed.189 
The Second Circuit based its analysis on the principle that 
courts are “bound to encourage” settlements because settlements 
are in the interest of the parties and of the public.190  The court 
pointed out that, where there are conflicting patent claims, the 
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id.  
 183 Id.at 193–94. 
 184 Id. at 194. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 196.  A judicial panel on multidistrict litigation consolidated and transferred 
the claims to the Eastern District of New York.  The complainants then filed a class 
action.  Id. 
 188 Id. at 194. 
 189 Id. at 198–99. 
 190 Id. at 202 (citing Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
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Sherman Act does not preclude settlements, even though 
settlements could harm competition.191  It also recognized that 
restricting patent settlements might undermine the purpose of 
patent law because it would generate uncertainty and hamper 
innovation.192 
Turning to reverse payment settlements specifically, the 
Second Circuit explicitly rejected applying the per se rule and 
explained that reverse payments are a natural byproduct of the 
Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime.193  “Hatch-Waxman essentially 
redistributes the relative risk assessments and explains the flow of 
settlement funds and their magnitude.  Because of the Hatch-
Waxman scheme, [the generic challengers] gain[] considerable 
leverage in patent litigation . . . .”194  The Second Circuit refused to 
“categorically condemn[]” reverse payments in what it perceived 
to be a regulatory regime that redistributed litigation risks and 
undercut patentee certainty.195 
While the Second Circuit conceded that economically rational 
behavior is not necessarily lawful,196 it reasoned that a patent 
settlement raises antitrust concerns only if the settlement is a 
vehicle for avoiding antitrust law.197  Under this reasoning, a large 
 
 191 Id. at 202–03 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); Nestle 
Co. v. Chester’s Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. 
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27–29 (1994); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 
540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Posner, J., sitting by designation)). 
 192 Id. at 203. 
 193 Id. at 205–06 (“[W]e decline to conclude (and repeat that the plaintiffs do not ask us 
to conclude) that reverse payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act such that an 
allegation of an agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an antitrust 
violation.  We do not think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its 
patent monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation.”). 
 194 Id. at 207 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 
2005)). 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. at 208 (“We agree that even if ‘reverse payments are a natural by-product of 
the Hatch-Waxman process,’ it does not follow that they are necessarily lawful.”) 
(quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003)).  
 197 Id. (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993) (Posner, J., sitting by designation)).  Extending the life of an almost certainly 
invalid patent, for example, would raise antitrust concerns. Id.  The owner of a weak 
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reverse payment settlement would not raise antitrust concerns if 
the patentee is only seeking to insure its preexisting property 
interests.198  The court conceded again that this rule could have the 
effect of permitting settlements that protect “undeserved” patent 
monopolies, but determined that succeeding ANDA challengers 
would erode a weak patent holder’s monopoly profits and reinstate 
competition.199 
Finally, the court presented a test for evaluating reverse 
payment settlements: An agreement is an antitrust violation only if 
it excludes competition beyond the scope of the patent’s 
protection.200  As long as competition is restrained within the scope 
of the patent monopoly, the agreement is lawful unless the 
plaintiffs can show that (1) the patent was procured by fraud on the 
PTO or (2) the patent infringement suit is “objectively baseless.”201  
Applying this test to the facts of the Zeneca-Barr settlement, the 
court held the agreement did not extend the scope of Zeneca’s 
tamoxifen patent because it precluded only generic marketing of 
tamoxifen, not any other non-infringing product.202  Moreover, the 
court distinguished this agreement from that in Cardizem, which 
involved Andrx “parking” the 180-day exclusivity period and 
blocking subsequent generic competition.203  Here, by changing its 
ANDA to a Paragraph III certification, Barr “appeared to” revoke 
its eligibility for the exclusivity period.204  Thus the court 
concluded that any harm to the plaintiffs was the result of the 
 
patent might “sue its competitors” and “settle[] the suit by licensing them to use its patent 
in exchange for their agreeing not to sell the patented product for less than the price 
specified in the license . . . [a mask for] fixing prices, in violation of antitrust law.” Id. 
 198 See id. at 210 (“Whatever the degree of the patent holder’s certainty, there is always 
some risk of loss that the patent holder might wish to insure against by settling.”). 
 199 Id. at 212 (“Every settlement payment to a generic manufacturer reduces the 
profitability of the patent monopoly.  The point will come when there are simply no 
monopoly profits with which to pay the new generic challengers.”). 
 200 Id. at 213. 
 201 Id. (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 
535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part sub nom. 
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 202 Id. at 213–14. 
 203 Id. at 214–15. 
 204 Id. 
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exclusionary power that reposes in a patent monopoly, not antitrust 
abuse.205 
2. Judge Pooler’s Dissent 
Judge Pooler, in a widely cited dissent in Tamoxifen, criticized 
the majority’s standard as “insufficiently protective of the 
consumer interests safeguarded by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the 
antitrust laws.”206  She proposed a more searching scrutiny: 
I see no reason why the general standard for 
evaluating an anti-competitive agreement, i.e., its 
reasonableness, should not govern in this context.  
In assessing reasonableness, the fact finder must 
consider all the circumstances affecting a restrictive 
agreement.  Of course, the strength of the patent 
must be central to any antitrust analysis involving a 
patent.  Thus, in assessing the reasonability of a 
Hatch-Waxman settlement, I would rely primarily 
on the strength of the patent as it appeared at the 
time at which the parties settled and secondarily on 
(a) the amount the patent holder paid to keep the 
generic manufacturer from marketing its product, 
(b) the amount the generic manufacturer stood to 
earn during its period of exclusivity, and (c) any 
ancillary anti-competitive effects of the agreement 
including the presence or absence of a provision 
allowing the parties to manipulate the generic’s 
exclusivity period.207 
Judge Pooler’s standard embeds in the antitrust analysis an 
evaluation of the strength of the patent.208  Such an evaluation is 
not a feature of the majority’s “scope of the patent” test, an 
absence that Judge Pooler believed rendered the scope of the patent 
test imbalanced in favor of antitrust defendants.209  Applying her 
 
 205 Id. at 219–20. 
 206 Id. at 224 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 207 Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 
50, 56 (2d Cir.1997)). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 221. 
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standard to the facts of this case, Judge Pooler reasoned that, in 
light of the district court finding that Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent 
was invalid, the court should have denied the defendants’ 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss and permitted discovery.210 
3. Declining to Revisit Tamoxifen 
The Second Circuit recently heard an antitrust challenge to a 
reverse payment settlement between Bayer, the patentee for the 
active ingredient in ciprofloxacin hydrochloride (Cipro), and Barr, 
the generic firm that filed the first ANDA-IV to market a generic 
version of the drug.211  The circuit panel, which included Judge 
Pooler, explained that it was “bound” to apply the standard 
adopted in Tamoxifen212 and ruled that the agreement was 
lawful.213  But the panel also expressed its concern that Tamoxifen 
may have been wrongly decided.214  It offered for support four 
reasons—namely, that (1) the United States has urged the Second 
Circuit to repudiate Tamoxifen for “inappropriately permitt[ing] 
patent holders to contract their way out of a statutorily imposed 
risk . . . while claiming antitrust immunity”;215 (2) the incidence of 
reverse payment settlements has increased since the Tamoxifen 
decision;216 (3) Senator Hatch, one of the bill’s drafters, has 
expressed strong disapproval of the agreements;217 and (4) the 
Tamoxifen panel may have misinterpreted the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.218  At the end of its opinion, the court invited the plaintiffs to 
petition for a rehearing en banc.219 
 
 210 Id. 
 211 Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011). 
 212 Id. at 106. 
 213 Id. at 110. 
 214 Id. at 108. 
 215 Id. at 108–09 (quoting Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s 
Invitation at 14–15, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 
(2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) No. 05-2851-cv(L), 2009 WL 8385027, at *14–15).   
 216 Id. at 109 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Antitrust Institute in Support 
of Petitioners at 3 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103), Ark. Carpenters Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) No. 10-762, 2011 
WL 63543, at *3). 
 217 Id. at 109 (citing 148 Cong. Rec. S7565 (July 30, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)). 
 218 Id. at 109. 
 219 Id. at 110. 
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In September 2010, over Judge Pooler’s strong dissent, the 
Second Circuit denied rehearing the case en banc.220  “I think that 
our Tamoxifen decision unambiguously deserves reexamination,” 
she dissented.221  “It will be up to the Supreme Court or Congress 
to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals.”222 
4. Before the Supreme Court: F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. 
On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the 
government’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.223  The case was renamed to F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. following 
Watson’s acquisition of the Swiss drugmaker Actavis Group in 
October 2012.224  The Court’s decision may finally reconcile the 
pharmaceutical industry’s unique tension between patent law and 
antitrust law, a matter that has concerned the FTC for over a 
decade.225 
Actavis involves a reverse payment settlement between the 
NDA holder for AndroGel, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, and two 
generic manufacturers, then Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock 
Laboratories.226  AndroGel is a prescription topical gel used to 
treat low testosterone in adult males.227  Although the patent for the 
synthetic testosterone used in AndroGel expired years ago, Watson 
 
 220 Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 221 Id. at 781. 
 222 Id. at 782. 
 223 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 
2012) (No. 12-416). 
 224 Press Release, Actavis, Watson Announces New Name—Actavis—for Global 
Operations (Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://ir.actavis.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778& 
p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1752588&highlight=.  Oral arguments for Actavis took place on 
March 25, 2013. Transcript of Oral Argument, F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 
(11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-
416.pdf.  
 225 J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlements and the Supreme Court, Address Before the CBI’s 2nd Annual Life Sciences 
Compliance, Legal, and Regulatory Congress (Sep. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/120921cbipharmaspeech.pdf. 
 226 Watson, 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 
7, 2012) (No. 12-416). 
 227 Id. at 1303. 
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obtained patent protection for a gel formulation of the drug in 
2003.228  Four months after the PTO granted Solvay’s patent 
application in 2003, Watson and Paddock filed separate ANDA-
IVs for the drug with the FDA.229  Watson, the first filer, became 
eligible for the 180-day marketing exclusivity period.230  Solvay 
brought a patent infringement suit against both companies within 
forty-five days, triggering the thirty-month stay provision.231  
When the thirty-month stay on the FDA’s approval of Watson’s 
ANDA expired in 2006, the suit was still pending in federal district 
court.232 
Watson estimated “that its generic version of AndroGel would 
sell for about twenty-five percent of the price of branded 
AndroGel, which could decrease the sales of branded AndroGel by 
ninety percent and cut Solvay’s profits by $125 million per 
year.”233  Before the district court could rule on Watson and 
Paddock’s motions for summary judgment, which were fully 
briefed, the parties agreed to settle the suit.234  The generic 
manufacturers agreed not to market generic versions of AndroGel 
until 2015—five years before Solvay’s patent would expire—in 
exchange for multimillion-dollar yearly payments.235 
After the settlements were reported to the FTC pursuant to the 
Medicare Act, the agency brought an antitrust action under 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) against the parties.236  The FTC “urged [the 
court] to adopt a rule that an exclusion payment is unlawful if, 
viewing the situation objectively as of the time of the settlement, it 
is more likely than not that the patent would not have blocked 
generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.”237  Under 
 
 228 Id. at 1304. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 1305. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).  
 237 Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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this approach, the FTC would have the burden of proving that 
Solvay was unlikely to prevail in the underlying patent 
infringement litigation.  According to the FTC, since Solvay’s 
AndroGel patent was “vulnerable” at the time of the settlement, it 
was “unlikely to prevail” in the patent infringement suit and the 
FTC could state an antitrust claim.238 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC’s approach for several 
reasons.239  First, it declared that the FTC’s position is inconsistent 
with the circuit’s precedents.  “Our decisions focus on the potential 
exclusionary effect of the patent, not the likely exclusionary 
effect.”240  In other words, so long as the patent for the drug was 
active, the court refused to inquire into its actual exclusionary 
power.  Second, the court decided that “retroactively predicting 
from a past perspective a future that never occurred is . . . 
perilous.”241  It reasoned that assessing the infringement claim as 
of the time of settlement would impose a profound burden on 
litigants and scarce judicial resources, and would be unreliable 
anyway.242 
Finally, Watson explained that the FTC’s approach would 
require the circuit courts to make substantive determinations for 
which they are not institutionally equipped.243  “We are ill-
equipped to make a judgment about the merits of a patent 
infringement claim . . . . The FTC’s approach is in tension with 
Congress’ decision to have appeals involving patent issues decided 
by the Federal Circuit.”244  The Federal Circuit has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.245  Thus, the court struck 
down the FTC’s approach for (1) being inconsistent with 
precedent, (2) promoting unstable judicial policy, and (3) 
generating tension with Congress’s decision that the Federal 
Circuit hears patent appeals.246 
 
 238 Id. at 1313. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 1312–13. 
 241 Id. at 1313. 
 242 Id. at 1314. 
 243 Id. at 1315. 
 244 Id.  
 245 Id. at 1314 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)). 
 246 See id. at 1313–15. 
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Instead, the court reiterated the scope of the patent test.  
“[A]bsent sham [Hatch-Waxman patent infringement] litigation or 
fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is 
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects 
fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”247  
Because the FTC’s complaint attempted to state an antitrust claim 
by retroactively assessing, as of the time of the settlement, the 
likelihood Solvay would prevail in the underlying patent 
infringement suit, it did not state a plausible federal antitrust 
claim.248  The court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss249 and later denied the FTC’s petition for a rehearing en 
banc.250 
The FTC filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on October 4, 
2012,251 presenting the question of “[w]hether reverse-payment 
agreements are per se lawful unless the underlying patent litigation 
was a sham or the patent was obtained by fraud (as the court below 
held), or instead are presumptively anticompetitive and unlawful 
(as the Third Circuit has held).”252  In its petition, the FTC argued 
that the Supreme Court should overturn Watson because its 
approach “effectively equates a brand-name manufacturer’s 
allegation of infringement with a judgment in the manufacturer’s 
favor.”253  It explained that this outcome is incorrect for several 
reasons.  First, defendants usually win patent infringement suits.254  
In the cases litigated to final judgment, generic competitors prevail 
seventy-five percent of the time.255  Second, Congress clearly 
intended through the Hatch-Waxman Act and subsequent 
amendments for brand-name drug companies and generic 
manufacturers to use the judicial process to resolve patent 
 
 247 Id. at 1312. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 1315. 
 250 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 
(11th Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416). 
 251 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th 
Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416). 
 252 Id. at I. 
 253 Id. at 11. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 18 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103, at 19–20). 
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infringement claims.256  Third, federal antitrust laws condemn 
“naked agreements not to compete”257 as per se unreasonable 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.258 
C. The “Quick Look” Rule of Reason Test 
The petition described Watson as a superior vehicle for 
resolving the circuit split because Watson involves a federal 
agency enforcement action, which gives the government greater 
control over the litigation.259  K-Dur, on the other hand, is a private 
class action.260  Moreover, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch 
has remarked that Watson is superior because it was decided on a 
motion to dismiss, and therefore “presents a pure issue of law,” 
unlike K-Dur, which was decided on summary judgment.261 
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation marked a distinct split in the 
circuit courts’ trend toward the “scope of the patent” test.262  The 
Third Circuit rejected this test because it “assumed away” the 
question being litigated in the underlying patent suit.263  Instead, 
the court advocated a “quick look” rule of reason analysis.  Under 
this test, the fact finder treats “any payment from a patent holder to 
a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the 
market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of 
trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) 
was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-
competitive benefit.”264 
The Third Circuit derived its approach to reverse payment 
settlements from the conventional “rule of reason” analysis in 
 
 256 Id. at 11. 
 257 Id. 
 258 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, F.T.C. v. Watson 
Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416).. 
 259 See id. at 12 (“This case is a superior vehicle for addressing the question presented 
because it is brought by an agency charged by Congress with challenging unfair methods 
of competition . . . .”). 
 260 See id. 
 261 See Rosch, supra note 225, at 15. 
 262 See Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent 
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012). 
 263 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. 
 264 Id. at 218. 
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antitrust jurisprudence.265  Classically, “the finder of fact must 
decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of 
factors.”266  This involves, according to K-Dur, three parts: 
First, the plaintiff must show that the challenged 
conduct has produced anti-competitive effects 
within the market.  If the plaintiff meets the initial 
burden, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show 
that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently 
pro-competitive objective.”  Finally, the plaintiff 
can rebut the defendant’s purported pro-competitive 
justification by showing that the restraint is not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive 
objective.267 
The quick look test under the rule of reason represented a 
compromise between the rule of reason test, under which plaintiffs 
must “make a full showing of anticompetitive effects in the 
market,” and the per se rule, where market effects need not be 
examined.  The quick look rule of reason test is used when “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics 
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets” by virtue of their 
nature.268  Here, the court justified applying this test by 
“embrac[ing]” the “common sense conclusion that a payment 
flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic firm may 
suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties entering 
the agreement.”269 
While admitting that the quick look test does not encourage 
settlement to the same degree as the scope of the patent test, the 
court stated that “the judicial preference for settlement . . . should 
not displace countervailing policy objectives or, in this case, 
Congress’s determination . . . that litigated patent challenges are 
 
 265 Id. at 209 (citing State Oil v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 266 Id.  
 267 Id. (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 268 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 269 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andrx Pharms., 
Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
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necessary to protect consumers from unjustified monopolies by 
brand name drug manufacturers.”270  In light of Hatch-Waxman’s 
structure and legislative record, Congress’s objective was to 
increase litigated challenges to pharmaceutical patents, an aim 
reverse payment settlements frustrate. 271 
The court was also skeptical of Tamoxifen’s conclusion that 
subsequent ANDA-IV filers would restore competition after a 
reverse payment settlement.272  It noted that only the first ANDA-
IV challenger is eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period.273  
Moreover, a brand-name drug company’s profit margin could be 
wide enough to “pay off a whole series of challengers rather than 
suffer the possible loss of its patent through litigation.”274  
Contrary to the Tamoxifen panel, the Third Circuit believed 
settlements likely reduced subsequent generic competition. 
III. RESOLUTION: A PATENT-CENTRIC STANDARD OF ANTITRUST 
REVIEW 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act Neither Prohibits nor Endorses 
Settlements 
The Hatch-Waxman Act does not expressly prohibit 
settlements in a patent infringement suit.  Congress enacted the Act 
for two competing policy reasons: (1) to increase the availability of 
low cost generic drugs, and (2) to increase incentives for 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.275  To promote generic 
competition, the Act provided generic firms a safe harbor 
provision, an Abbreviated New Drug Application for streamlined 
FDA approval, and a 180-day marketing exclusivity period for the 
first applicant to submit to the FDA a “substantially complete” 
ANDA-IV.276  To promote innovation in the pharmaceutical 
 
 270 Id. at 217. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at 215. 
 273 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)). 
 274 Id. (citing King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514, 
521–22 (E.D. Pa. 2010), abrogated by K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197). 
 275 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 276 See supra Part I.B.1.a. 
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industry, the Act provided a patent term extension to allow patent 
proprietors time to recoup their research and development costs, 
non-patent marketing exclusivity to the first NDA applicant to 
obtain approval for an NCE, and a thirty-month stay of FDA 
approval for a patent infringement challenge to a generic firm’s 
ANDA-IV.277  It did not, and still does not, prohibit settlements in 
a patent infringement suit.278 
The Act reflects a careful balance struck by Congress, a 
balance that some commentators fear has been upset by reverse 
payment settlements.279  But the six prominent provisions in 
Hatch-Waxman that this Note has highlighted are each designed to 
remedy a preexisting, congressionally identified problem.280  
Congress provided the patent term extension, for instance, to 
restore patent terms that had then been effectively eroded by FDA 
requirements and approval processes.281  It introduced the ANDA 
to streamline the FDA approval process for generics and avoid 
“needlessly costly, duplicative” clinical trials.282  It provided non-
patent marketing exclusivity to drugs that introduce new active 
ingredients to encourage research and development,283 while 
granting a 180-day marketing exclusivity period to the first 
ANDA-IV applicant to encourage generic challenges.284  Finally, it 
granted generic firms safe harbor while they conduct experiments 
reasonably related to FDA approval,285 while providing an 
automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval to patent holders 
who bring timely patent infringement suits.286  In 2003, when 
Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act, it only required 
settlements to be filed with the FTC and DOJ for review.287 
B. The Circuits Have Not Resolved the Conflict Between Patent 
 
 277 See supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 278 See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 280 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 281 See supra Part I.B.1.b.i. 
 282 See supra Part I.B.1.a.ii. 
 283 See supra Part I.B.1.b.ii. 
 284 See supra Part I.B.1.a.iii. 
 285 See supra Part I.B.1.a.i. 
 286 See supra Part I.B.1.b.iii. 
 287 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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and Antitrust Law 
The Third Circuit’s presumptive illegality approach in K-Dur is 
unsuitable in light of Hatch Waxman’s silence regarding 
settlements.288  The court improperly forces the parties in the 
patent infringement suit to litigate their case to final judgment or 
settle without a reverse payment.289  But the uncertainty of 
litigation and potential consequences of an adverse outcome to the 
plaintiff-patent proprietor, relative to the potential consequences of 
an adverse outcome to the defendant-patent challenger, help 
explain how a reverse payment can be rational, rather than 
unreasonable.290 
On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s “scope of the patent” 
test approach in Tamoxifen is no more satisfactory.  As K-Dur 
correctly criticizes, the Tamoxifen test effectively “assumes” that 
the underlying patent is valid, and asks instead whether the parties’ 
settlement falls within the “scope of the patent.”291  If an 
agreement falls within the scope of the patent, it poses no antitrust 
concern; if it does not, then the court applies antitrust scrutiny.292  
But if the patent is not valid in the first instance, then it has no 
scope at all.293  The primary beneficiaries of this test are those who 
hold weak patents.294 
C. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a Patent-Centric Standard of 
Antitrust Review 
Appropriate antitrust analysis of reverse payment settlements 
must subject the patent to scrutiny.  The quick look test disregards 
the patent and the scope of the patent test assumes its validity.  
Only Judge Pooler’s test, articulated in her dissent in Tamoxifen, 
recommends evaluating the strength of the patent at the time of the 
reverse payment settlement.295  After evaluating the patent’s 
 
 288 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 289 See supra notes 262–274 and accompanying text. 
 290 See supra notes 143–149 and accompanying text. 
 291 See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 292 See supra notes 200–205 and accompanying text. 
 293 See supra notes 208–209 and accompanying text. 
 294 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 295 See supra notes 206–210 and accompanying text. 
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strength, a court could then conclude whether the reverse payment 
settlement terms were unreasonable under the Sherman Act.296  
This approach harmonizes the exclusive principles of patent law 
with the procompetitive principles of antitrust law. 
The Tamoxifen case presented a relatively simple evaluation of 
the strength of the patent—there, at the time the parties entered 
into the settlement at issue, the district court had recently ruled that 
Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent was invalid because the NDA filer had 
withheld critical testing information from the PTO.297  The 
question remains how Judge Pooler would have evaluated the 
strength of the patent in the absence of the district court’s ruling, as 
she does not offer a test for how to evaluate strength of a patent. 
Evaluating the strength of a patent is difficult to pinpoint with 
precision and may be unknowable to the patentee itself, who may 
enter into multimillion-dollar settlements to insure against random 
outcomes.298  But the strength of a patent is critical to determining 
whether an agreement is anticompetitive.299  An evaluation of 
patent strength is therefore a necessary feature to any standard of 
antitrust review for reverse payment settlements.  Determining 
which factors are relevant to the evaluation should be left to case-
by-case adjudication. 
The court of competent jurisdiction to review patent strength is 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit 
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases.  This 
grant of exclusive jurisdiction reflects a congressional choice to 
have experts evaluate questions pertaining to technical evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The decade-long debate over the legality of reverse payment 
settlements has had its day in Court.  This Note has argued that any 
standard of antitrust review for reverse payment settlements must 
involve an evaluation of the patent’s strength at the time of 
 
 296 See supra Part I.B.4. 
 297 See supra notes 181–192 and accompanying text. 
 298 See, e.g., supra notes 179–185. 
 299 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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settlement.  The Federal Circuit is the proper court to review patent 
strength evaluations given Congress’s decision to have appeals 
involving patent issues reviewed by the Federal Circuit.  This 
would give effect to the legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act while preserving a meaningful place for patent law and 
antitrust law in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
